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Outbreaks of respiratory infection in institutions in On-
tario, Canada were studied from April 20 to June 12, 2009, 
during the early stages of the emergance of inﬂ  uenza A 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009. Despite widespread presence of 
inﬂ  uenza in the general population, only 2 of 83 outbreaks 
evaluated by molecular methods were associated with pan-
demic (H1N1) 2009.  
R
espiratory infection outbreaks in institutions housing 
large numbers of residents create an ideal environ-
ment for disease transmission (1). Patients in long-term 
care facilities (LTCFs) for the elderly are more susceptible 
to respiratory infections and have a higher risk for compli-
cations (2,3).
The Study
We reviewed respiratory infection outbreaks regis-
tered with the Public Health Laboratory (PHL), Ontario 
Agency for Health Protection and Promotion dating back to 
October 2007 (Table 1). Molecular detection methods were 
used for a subset of outbreaks registered during October 1, 
2008–April 19, 2009. After emergence of severe respira-
tory illness clusters in Mexico in early April, intensiﬁ  ed 
tracking of respiratory infection outbreaks in Ontario was 
undertaken. Consequently, more information was available 
on outbreaks registered during the spring (April 20 to June 
12, 2009); these data comprise the bulk of the study.
Respiratory infection outbreaks in LTCFs were de-
ﬁ  ned as any of the following: 2 cases of acute respiratory 
tract illness, 1 of which was laboratory-conﬁ  rmed; 3 cases 
of acute respiratory tract illness within 48 hours in a geo-
graphic area (e.g., unit, ﬂ  oor); and >2 units having a case of 
acute respiratory illness within a 48-hour period. Inﬂ  uenza-
like-illness was deﬁ  ned as acute onset of respiratory illness 
with fever and cough with >1 of the following: sore throat, 
arthralgia, myalgia, or prostration.
From April 20 through June 12, 2009, a total of 112 
respiratory infection outbreaks were registered. Molecular 
testing was not used in 29 outbreaks (e.g., insufﬁ  cient/in-
appropriate sample). Most of the remaining 83 outbreaks 
submitted for molecular testing originated from LTCFs 
(91%); hospitals (2%), child care centers (2%), and psychi-
atric care facilities (1%) comprised the remainder. Facility 
type was not known for 4% of outbreaks tested. Mean age 
of persons tested as part of an outbreak investigation was 
82 years (SD 13.96 years) and median age was 85 years; 
95% were >57 years of age.
Testing on the 589 specimens received from 161 out-
breaks registered from October 1, 2008 through June 12, 
2009 was performed by real-time reverse transcription–
PCR (RT-PCR) for the inﬂ  uenza A virus matrix gene and 
the Luminex Respiratory Viral Panel (RVP) (Luminex Mo-
lecular Diagnostics, Toronto, Ontario, Canada) for other 
respiratory viruses.
An etiologic agent was identiﬁ  ed in 89% of the 161 
outbreaks tested by molecular methods. One-hundred-
eleven (69%) were caused by 1 etiologic agent. Two and 
3 different pathogens were identiﬁ  ed in 24 (15%) and 6 
(4%) outbreaks, respectively. Four pathogens were identi-
ﬁ  ed in 2 (1%) outbreaks. No etiologic agent was identiﬁ  ed 
in 18 (11%) of the outbreaks tested by molecular methods, 
which includes 1 specimen in which the result was indeter-
minate for coronavirus OC43. A wide range of causative 
etiologic agents were detected for outbreaks by the RVP 
assay (Table 2). Specimens from most patients were posi-
tive for enterovirus/rhinovirus (114 patients) followed by 
metapneumovirus (85), parainﬂ  uenza virus type 3 (55), and 
human inﬂ  uenza virus A (H3) (41). No virus was identiﬁ  ed 
in 186 patients.
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Table 1. Respiratory outbreak submissions to Ontario, Canada, 





Region 2007–08 2008–09 2008 2009
Ontario 671 543 117 112†
Greater Toronto 
area‡
139 101§ 34 21
*Influenza season is delineated as October 1–April 19; spring season is 
delineated as April 20–June 12. 
†Specimens from 83 of the 112 outbreaks were tested by the RVP assay. 
‡Greater Toronto Area includes submissions by Peel, York, and Toronto 
Public Health Units.  
§Specimens from 78 of the 101 outbreaks were tested by the Luminex 
xTAG Respiratory Viral Panel (Luminex Molecular Diagnostics, Toronto, 
Ontario, Canada). Co-infections were noted in 22 of the patients tested by 
the RVP assay. In 1 LTCF outbreak, 2 patients had co-in-
fection of an untypeable inﬂ  uenza A and enterovirus/rhino-
virus on testing by RVP. An inﬂ  uenza A real-time RT-PCR 
result was negative in both patients; 1 patient had a co-in-
fection with respiratory syncytial virus B and enterovirus/
rhinovirus. Co-infections with coronavirus subtypes 229E 
and NL63 were the most common, observed in 10 of the 22 
patients (45%) infected with multiple pathogens. Isolates 
from 1 patient were positive for 3 viruses (coronavirus sub-
types 229E and NL63 and enterovirus/rhinovirus).
One of the 2 outbreaks identiﬁ  ed as caused by pandem-
ic (H1N1) 2009 originated from a LTCF was not observed 
until June 3, 2009, six weeks into the evolving pandemic, 
despite widespread community prevalence. The second 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 outbreak, registered on June 11, 
2009, originated from a hospital treating patients with inﬂ  u-
enza-like illness. Seasonal inﬂ  uenza (H1N1 and H3N2) or 
pandemic (H1N1 2009) was detected in 2,966 (25.5%), and 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 in 2,203 (19%) of 11,612 persons 
tested at PHL for inﬂ  uenza A by real-time RT-PCR dur-
ing April 20–June 12, 2009. Seasonal inﬂ  uenza A (H3N2) 
was only identiﬁ  ed in 273 specimens (11.0%) of the 2,476 
inﬂ  uenza A positive samples subtyped. However, it was the 
strain responsible for 15 (88%) of the typeable inﬂ  uenza A 
outbreaks at the same time. Seasonal inﬂ  uenza A (H1N1) 
was absent from institutional outbreaks and only detected 
in 41 (2%) of subtyped inﬂ  uenza A–positive samples from 
the general population.
Persons with laboratory-conﬁ  rmed pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 infection tested at the PHL, Ontario Agency for 
Health Protection and Promotion, were younger than those 
tested as part of outbreak investigations. Mean and median 
ages were 21.5 and 16 years, respectively; only 10% were 
>46 years of age.
Conclusions
The number of respiratory infection outbreaks in insti-
tutions submitted to PHL may reﬂ  ect disease impact caused 
by respiratory viruses during the inﬂ  uenza season. Respi-
ratory viruses during the 2007–08 season may have been 
more active than those of the 2008–09 season because the 
number of outbreaks registered with PHL decreased from 
1 year to the next. Declaration of pandemic status for the 
novel (H1N1) virus has not inﬂ  uenced the reporting of re-
spiratory infection outbreaks from institutions in Ontario 
because submission rates for the corresponding period in 
2007–08 and 2008–09 are similar. Variation would not be 
expected because reporting is required by Ontario law (4). 
Respiratory viruses detected in outbreaks in institu-
tions reﬂ  ect those known to be major causes of acute respi-
ratory disease in the community; prevalence varies based 
on geographic location, season, and detection methods 
(5–7). Free access to such institutions by members of the 
community (staff or visitors), in conjunction with commu-
nal close quarters of residents, creates an ideal environment 
for propagation of viral respiratory outbreaks (8).
Current guidelines for isolation during viral respiratory 
outbreaks are not tailored for the speciﬁ  c virus. As shown 
in this study, multiplex molecular testing makes it possible 
to identify the virus causing most LTCF respiratory infec-
tion outbreaks. Infection control guidelines for a speciﬁ  c 
outbreak could be modiﬁ  ed based on the incubation period 
and duration of viral shedding for the identiﬁ  ed virus (9).
The most commonly identiﬁ  ed virus in our study was 
enterovirus/rhinovirus. Clinicians should be reminded that 
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Table 2. Etiologic agents identified by the Luminex Respiratory Virus Panel* from samples submitted by regional health units during
outbreaks, Canada†  
Etiologic agent 
2009 spring outbreaks, 
Ontario, no. (%)  
2009 spring outbreaks 
GTA,‡ no. (%) 
2008–2009 influenza season 
outbreaks, GTA,‡ no. (%) 
Coronavirus OC43  1 (1)  0 18 (23) 
Coronavirus NL63  0 0 6 (8) 
Coronavirus 229E  4 (5)  0 9 (12) 
Metapneumovirus  17 (20)  2 (12)  21 (27) 
Respiratory syncytial virus A 0 0 5 (6)
Respiratory syncytial virus B 1 (1)  0 17 (22) 
Influenza A (H3, human)  11 (13)  6 (35)  4 (5) 
Parainfluenza 1  1 (1)  0 (0)  1 (1) 
Parainfluenza 3  22 (27)  7 (41)  3 (4) 
Enterovirus/rhinovirus  31 (37)  3 (18)  15§ (19) 
Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus  1 (1)  1 (6)  0
Invalid test¶  0 0 1 (1) 
None 6 (7)  0 11 (14) 
Outbreaks tested  83 17 78
*Luminex Molecular Diagnostics, Toronto, Ontario, Canada. 
†GTA, Greater Toronto area. Spring season is delineated as April 20–June 12; influenza season is delineated as October 1–April 19. 
‡Iincludes submissions by Peel, York, and Toronto Public Health Units only. 
§Seven of the 15 outbreaks were confirmed as rhinovirus by the Seeplex RV12 detection kit (Seegene, Inc., Seoul, South Korea). 
¶Reported when the internal control is not detected during a run. Respiratory Infection and Pandemic (H1N1) 2009
rhinovirus can cause severe lower respiratory tract infec-
tion, including death, as documented in several LTCF out-
breaks (10,11). These data highlight the need for molecular 
capacity to diagnose rhinovirus infection because detection 
is otherwise limited to less sensitive viral culture systems.
This review of outbreaks predominantly involving 
elderly persons in LTCFs highlights the sparing of older 
persons by pandemic (H1N1) 2009. Possible explanations 
include cross-protective antibodies from previous expo-
sure to inﬂ  uenza A (H1N1) strains circulating before the 
antigenic shift of inﬂ  uenza A to subtype H2N2 in 1957 or 
minimal contact with those most likely to have imported 
the pandemic strain into Canada (young travelers) (12). In 
addition, older persons may have less contact with the age 
group (children 10–19 years of age), with most cases being 
in Ontario. Our ﬁ  ndings support Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention guidelines for vaccination with monovalent 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus vaccine. These guidelines 
have not placed older persons in a high priority group for 
vaccination because increased rates of hospitalization and 
severe disease caused by pandemic (H1N1) 2009 have not 
been observed (13,14). Investment in multiplex technolo-
gies to investigate respiratory outbreaks in LTCFs shortens 
time for pathogen detection, helps guide infection control 
and vaccination policies, and can potentially save resources 
spent on other investigations.
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